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BOOK REVIEW
Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability
in Canada
By LORNE SOSSIN
(Toronto: Carswell, 1999)1 246, xxxii pages
Never before has there been so much concern and debate about
the appropriate role of the Canadian courts. Our sense of what kinds of
disputes courts should be resolving is challenged by the nature of much
high-profile litigation. Just this year, for example, a group of voters
attempted to have the British Columbia Supreme Court set aside a
provincial election for allegedly fraudulent assurances as to the existence
of a budget surplus made during the course of an election campaign by a
government seeking re-election.2 Three social activists, two of them
clergymen, defended a criminal charge of mischief for defacing a war
memorial. They asserted that a memorial in which a sword is embedded
in a cross amounts to blasphemy and a condonation of war.3 Conrad
Black is apparently persisting in his action in the Ontario courts to hold
the Prime Minister accountable legally for blocking Mr. Black's efforts
to become a member of the House of Lords.4 Are these issues that are
really suitable for judicial evaluation?
These discrete instances aside, the most pervasive controversy
remains the legitimacy of the authority that the courts have exercised
since 1982 with the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.5 Was it a "good thing" that the courts were assigned the task
of policing legislation and governmental action by reference to the
standards enshrined in the Charter? Have the courts been exercising this
new-found power with too little restraint? Have they been captured
inappropriately by various interests groups seeking to achieve political
ends through judicial rather than political processes?
I [hereinafter Boundaries of Judicial Review].
2 For the judgment allowing this cause of action to proceed, see Friesen v. Hammel, [1997]
W.W.R. 268 (B.C. S.C.).
3 For an account and commentary, see M. Valpy, "When it's not Just War" The Globe and
Mail (29 May 2000) R7. The three activists were later acquitted.
4 See Black v. Canada (Prime Minister) (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 532 (Sup. Ct.).
5 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter Charter].
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Indeed, some argue that the Charter and the courts' role under it
are largely responsible for the heightened expectations that many
litigants now have of the judicial process in other situations where
Charter values are not at stake. In part, this may explain the
phenomenon of the three specific examples already provided. It may
also account for the Supreme Court's expansive view of the reach of
judicially enforceable constitutional norms as reflected in the
resurrection of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 18676 as a potential
source of constitutionally enforceable rights7 and, even more notably, in
the terms of the Court's judgment in Reference re Secession of Quebec.8
In particular, the Court's articulation in that reference of four
underlying constitutional principles 9 has begun to spawn new forms of or
bases for litigation. This is exemplified most dramatically by the Ontario
Divisional Court's use of the principle of respect for minorities as a basis
for judicial review of the Ontario government's decision to close the
largely francophone H6pital Montfort in Ottawa. 10
Given this significant evolution in the character of the disputes
dealt with by Canadian courts, Lorne Sossin's Boundaries of Judicial
Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada has appeared at a particularly
opportune time. The sustained nature of the challenges to judicial
authority has called for a thorough examination of the underlying
principle of justiciability and what makes a dispute suitable for judicial
resolution. This work also fills a gap in Canadian legal literature to the
extent that it is the first sustained or book-length consideration of the
concept of justiciability as developed by our courts. Moreover, to the
extent that Sossin's research has revealed a Canadian approach to issues
subsumed within a concept of justiciability that finds no precise parallels
in other comparable common law jurisdictions, this is a work that will be
of considerable worth to those outside Canada with an interest in the
limits on the tasks that can be assigned to or assumed by, and performed
well and appropriately by, courts as we generally conceive of them
functioning in a common law setting.
6 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91, reprinted in R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 5.
7 In particular, see the judgment of Lamer C.J.C. in Reference re Remuneration of Judges of
Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
8 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
9 Ibid.at 248: "federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for
minority rights."
10 Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santd) (1999), 181 D.L.R.
(4th) 263 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
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One of the other singular contributions that Sossin has made in
the writing of this book is the very identification and bringing together of
various strands of Canadian jurisprudence in both public and private law
that constitute the principal sources of our law of justiciability. Indeed,
until comparatively recently, the expression or word was one that
surfaced seldom in Canadian case law. Thus, even with modern aids such
as searchable databases, there was no easy way of locating various
precedents in which issues of justiciability had surfaced. There was no
common language which our judges have used invariably to deal with
such problems, and, indeed, on many occasions, what at root were issues
of justiciability were categorized under other headings. Traditional tools
for performing effective case law research were simply not reliable.
Different techniques were required, and it is a tribute to Sossin's depth
of knowledge, imagination, and hard work that we now have a work of
reference for occasions when such issues surface.
Of course, as Sossin himself acknowledges in the first chapter,
his task was not made easier by the fact that, even among those who had
paid specific attention to the topic in the past, there had been no
consensus as to the precise boundaries of the principles of justiciability.ll
Moreover, most (including Sossin) seem to accept that the delineation of
what is appropriate for judicial determination cannot be the subject of
precise philosophical, empirical or objective inquiry but also depends on
normative assumptions and a broad range of contextual considerations.
To concede this point, one only has to reflect again on the extent to
which our experience with and, in most instances, expectations of the
judicial process have changed in Canada since the Charter.
A further example of justiciability concerns, which features
prominently in Sossin's book, is provided by the considerable divergence
on whether courts in the common law tradition should be involved in
reference cases; that is, in the giving of purely advisory opinions to
governments on the law. Indeed, this is a divergence which exists in the
world of theory and in the laws of Canada, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia, to cite the jurisdictions used in the book for
illustrative purposes. It is a divergence which is conditioned by the
relevant constitutional norms of the various legal systems as well as more
pragmatic considerations such as the extent to which courts can deal
effectively with questions put to them in abstract terms and whether
scarce judicial resources are deployed appropriately in allowing such
cases to be presented.
II Boundaries of Judicial Review, supra note 1 at 2.
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In large measure, Sossin is content to use the rather more
developed organizing principles of United States case law on
justiciability as a framework for presenting and analyzing the relevant
Canadian authorities. The relevant American doctrines are those of
"standing, mootness, ripeness, and political questions," 2 and the latter
three constitute the three core chapters of this work. However, Sossin
rejects standing as such as a component of justiciability for the reason
that standing is about who may bring a case to the courts rather than
what the courts may decide.13 Nonetheless, to the extent that Canadian
law of public interest standing requires judicial consideration of the
extent to which the public interest litigant is raising a justiciable issue, he
acknowledges quite correctlyl 4 that the jurisprudence on standing will
quite often include relevant discussion of principles of justiciability.
Indeed, this is true of not just one but all three elements of the
Canadian law of public interest standing. When Le Dain J. (for the
Supreme Court in Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance))15 spoke of
justiciability as one of the matters that had to be addressed in
determining whether a public interest litigant should be accorded
standing as a matter of judicial discretion, he specifically referred to the
need to consider whether the question raised was one that was in and of
itself "appropriate for judicial determination."16 Was it a question that
raised legal issues suitable for the court's consideration, such as the
interpretation of a statute or an agreement?
However, each of the other two elements of Le Dain J.'s test
(which continues to be applied in public interest standing cases) are also
very much at the heart of the broader conception of justiciability that
Sossin accepts for the purpose of his work. For Sossin, justiciability is not
just about whether an issue is a "legal" one in abstract terms but it is also
concerned with whether it will be presented in a manner which enables
appropriate judicial resolution and whether or not it is timely for the
court to take the case. These same considerations are embedded in the
other two limbs of the Finlay test:
The judicial concern about the allocation of scarce judicial resources and the need to
screen out the mere.busybody is addressed by the requirements ... that there be a serious
issue raised and that a citizen have a genuine interest in the issue. ... The judicial concern
12 Ibid. at 21.
13 Ibid. at 5.
14 Ibid. at 6.
15 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 [hereinafter Finlay].
16 Boundaries of Judicial Review, supra note 1 at 4.
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that in the determination of an issue a court should have the benefit of the contending
views of the persons most directly affected by the issue ... is addressed by the
requirement .. that there be no other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue
may be brought before the court
1 7
Thus, while the emphasis might be different, many of the
relevant concerns at the very least overlap as between the two domains
of standing and justiciability. It therefore is not surprising that
references to the standing cases recur throughout the book and why
Sossin returns specifically to the standing cases in a separate section in
Chapter 5, "Procedural Dimensions of Justiciability."18 At a theoretical
level, this does, however, raise questions as to whether Sossin's
superficially attractive differentiation between standing and justiciability
on the basis of "who" and "what" can withstand scrutiny. More
particularly, it would have been informative to have heard a little more
about why American justiciability doctrine actually includes standing.
There are also other instances in which questions can be raised
or issue taken with the selection of what to include within the concept of
justiciability and what to leave out. Thus, in Chapter 2, "The Doctrine of
Ripeness," the author asserts that Canadian law has developed various
strands of a ripeness doctrine, all of which are founded on the principle
that purely hypothetical questions are not justiciable in a Court.19
This statement seems, however, to be undercut by his inclusion
of cases in which the court rejected an application for judicial review
simply on the basis that there was an alternative remedy or avenue of
recourse available. In many of these cases the court did not dismiss the
application because the questions raised were hypothetical at least in the
sense of not being able to "be answered with any assurance of
correctness." 20 Rather, the concern was with the allocation of scarce
judicial resources and respect for legislative choice. Given that, there
must be some question as to whether such cases fit readily within the
author's concept of "justiciability" and, even if they do, why Sossin does
not also feature the case law on collateral attack2l and, more generally,
undue delay in seeking relief, case law which is based on those same
concerns.
17 Finlay, supra note 15 at 633.
18 Boundaries of Judicial Review, supra note 1 at 202-06.
1 9 1bid at 31.
20 As defined by Lamer C.J.C. in Reference re Excise TaxAct (Canada), (sub nom. Reference re
Goody & Services Tax), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 445, cited in Boundaries of Judicial Review, supra note 1 at 27.
21 There is in fact a mention of the collateral attack jurisprudence but only for a more general
statement: see Boundaries of Judicial Review, supra note 1 at 84.
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Similarly, there is room for debate about the contents of Chapter
622 which is aimed at demonstrating, notwithstanding the lack of explicit
acknowledgment, that the Supreme Court has in effect adopted a form
of "political questions" doctrine. My sense is that that argument could
be made even more strongly by reference to the continued common law
and statutory protections afforded to the "Crown" in litigation,
protections which at root are often concerned with putting certain issues
(either directly or by procedural and evidential rules such as "executive
privilege") beyond the domain of the courts.
However, these are for the most part minor quibbles particularly
in the case of Chapter 6, which is probably the strongest and most
ground-breaking in the book. In demonstrating the extent to which
Canadian courts refuse to deal with issues for reasons that correspond to
the American "political questions" doctrine, Sossin undermines any
continued acceptance at face value of Wilson J.'s oft-quoted statement
in Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R.23 that Canada does not have a "political
questions" restriction on justiciability. From this point on, surely the task
of our courts will be to recognize the reality that Sossin has exposed and
either to reevaluate that reality when cases arise or, more probably, to
develop a framework within which such concerns can be dealt with
consistently and appropriately.
Indeed, for these purposes, the courts would do well to give
serious consideration to the multi-factored approach that Sossin outlines
in his conclusion to this important chapter as a basis for identifying those
combinations of issues and context which contribute to make a matter
non-justiciable as a "political" question:
In the case of the political questions analysis, a court should similarly consider a range of
contextual factors, including evidence of a statutory intent to assign the dispute to
another branch of government, the likelihood that the dispute could be resolved through
political means, the nature of the issue and its seriousness for the party seeking judicial
review.24
While such an approach does not produce automatic answers, it may at
least serve to ensure that most judges are on the same page and lead to
the evolution of a rather more sophisticated and appropriately detailed
regime for dealing with such concerns. Indeed, Sossin himself is shrewd
enough to recognize that his proposed framework for analysis is but a
22 IbiiL at 227-38.
23 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 472.
24 Ibi at 200.
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starting point, not an end point in the rationalization of this area of the
law.
Other strengths of this work include Chapter 3, "The Doctrine of
Mootness," 25 which is comprehensive in its analysis of the issue, at least
in the public law domain, and usefully prescriptive. Also, both the
introductory and concluding chapters serve the normal purposes of such
chapters very well.
Aside from the concerns expressed above about the delineation
of the boundaries of justiciability, I think it is also fair to say that the
work pays too little attention to the problem of justiciability in private
law. Indeed, perhaps subconsciously, Sossin betrays his ambivalence on
this in the two part title of his work. Boundaries of Judicial Review
suggests a book confined to public law issues, while The Law of
Justiciability in Canada holds out the promise of general coverage of the
issue. The consequence is an at times uneasy and frustrating
compromise. As a traditionalist in such matters, I also lament the
obvious absence (particularly in the case of Chapter 2) of an experienced
legal editor with responsibility for careful proofreading and the removal
of unnecessary repetition. It could and should have been a cleaner and
tighter work. However, when measured against the book's obvious
contributions, these concerns are more than offset and can all be
addressed in what I trust will be an automatic second edition. This is a
field that cannot stand still and Lorne Sossin has had the wit to realize it
in producing a work which occupies with distinction a previously
unoccupied field.
David Mullan
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt
Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law
Faculty of Law, Queen's University
25 Ibid. at 93-130.
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